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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann, §§ 63-46(b)-16 and 78-2a3(2)(a) (1953, as amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether the Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing properly revoked Petitioner's license to practice as a
Registered Nurse in the State of Utah.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner has filed a Petition for Judicial Review of
an Order of the Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing of the Department of Commerce of the State of Utah (the
"Division") revoking Petitioner's license to practice as a
Registered Nurse in the State of Utah.

The administrative action

against Petitioner's nursing license was filed with the Division
on or about May 4, 1989, and the matter came on for
administrative hearing on September 21-23, 1989, before the
Nursing Board, with the Honorable J. Steven Eklund,
Administrative Law Judge, presiding.

On October 25, 1989 the

Division issued an Order adopting the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order of the Nursing Board,
The Order revoked Petitioner's license to practice as a
Registered Nurse in the State of Utah.

From this Order the

Petitioner has filed this Petition for Judicial Review.

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following Statement of Facts is taken verbatim from
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order
issued by the Nursing Board after hearing.

Citations to the

record have been added to the Board's facts,
1.

Respondent is, and at all times relevant to these

proceedings has been, licensed to practice as a registered nurse
in the State of Utah,

Respondent has been so licensed for

approximately fifteen years and has been employed a registered
nurse at various facilities during that time.

As relevant

herein, Respondent was employed at Pioneer Valley Hospital from
September 17, 1987 until July 2, 1988.

During the course of that

employment, Respondent initially worked on the psychiatric unit
and, later, in the emergency room.

Respondent was subsequently

employed at the Western Institute of Neuropsychiatry from
September 11, 1988 until October 12, 1988.

(Amended Petition at

paragraphs 2, 3a; Answer to Amended Petition at paragraph 1, Tr.
at pp. 505, 447-48, 358; Div, Ex. 7, 12).
2.

On March 2, 1988, a patient, referred to herein as

Jane Doe, was admitted to the psychiatric unit at Pioneer Valley
Hospital with a diagnosis of multiple personality disorder,
accompanied by depression with self-harm ideation,

D.G.,

a

clinical social worker, had provided treatment for Ms. Doe since
July 1987 and D,P,, a marriage and family therapist, had provided
psychotherapy treatment for her since December 1987.
24, 31, 132, 281-83, Resp. Ex. 1 ) .
2

(Tr. at pp.

3.

During Mrs. Doe's hospitalization, which continued

until April 15, 1988, Respondent worked three days per week and
provided nursing care to Mrs. Doe.

Respondent was present during

some psychiatric sessions conducted with Mrs. Doe by either J.L.
her admitting psychiatrist, or D.P. Respondent frequently
provided care to Mrs. Doe following her numerous psychiatric
sessions.

In so doing, he often conversed with some of her other

personalities and reviewed videotapes with her of the sessions
which had been conducted.

(Tr. at pp. 31-33, 136-39, 226, 262,

527) .
4.

Other members of the nursing staff on the

psychiatric unit also provided care to Mrs. Doe, although those
staff members were not inclined to provide as much care for her
as did Respondent.

During the course of Mrs. Doe's

hospitalization, Respondent spent increasingly more time with
her.

He periodically received telephone calls from Mrs. Doe at

his home when she was hospitalized.

On occasions, Respondent

would return to the hospital in response to either those calls or
upon contact from other nursing personnel.

(Tr. at pp. 437-47,

486-90).
5.

In mid-March 1988, hospital nursing administrators

cautioned Respondent and another nurse (S.H.) as to the excessive
time they had spent in intervention work with Mrs. Doe and
instructed them not to be as involved with her during such work.
Respondent and S. H. were also instructed to coordinate their
future activities with Mrs. Doe through her admitting
3

psychiatrist, marriage and family therapist and clinical social
worker.

(Tr. at pp. 490-93; Div. Ex. 6 ) .
6.

Respondent continued to work extensively with Mrs.

Doe and, on April 8 and April 10, 1988, he neglected to provide
adequate care for other patients as a result.

On April 14, 1988,

nursing administrators counseled Respondent in that regard, yet
he again neglected other patients while providing care to Mrs.
Doe during the last four hours of his shift on April 14, 1988.
The following day, Respondent was ordered to cease intervention
work with Mrs. Doe and she became noticeably upset when he
advised her that he would be on leave of absence from his
employment on the psychiatric unit at the hospital.

(Tr. at pp.

460,487-93; Div. Ex. 6 ) .
7.

On April 15, 1988, Mrs. Doe was discharged from the

hospital with the expectation that she would resume out-patient
treatment with her marriage and family therapist and her clinical
social worker.

S.H. contacted Respondent, who was not on duty at

the time, and informed him that Mrs. Doe was being discharged.
Respondent arrived at the hospital and, accompanied by one of his
children and S.H., Respondent took Mrs. Doe to his residence to
provide her with continuous supervision.

Respondent had

previously informed his wife and children of Mrs. Doe's
psychiatric condition. (Tr. at pp. 152-53, 159, 294, 308, 381-83,
464-66, 501).
8.

A few days latei:, Respondent and Mrs. Doe left his

residence and, from late-April through May 1988, Respondent
4

resided with Mr. and Mrs. Doe at their apartment.

On two

occasions during the just-stated time, Respondent accompanied Mr.
and Mrs. Doe to Southern Utah to visit with Mrs. Doe's parents.
Respondent took Mrs. Doe to sessions with D.P. and, thereafter,
periodically reviewed videotapes of those sessions with Mrs. Doe.
Respondent often conversed with Mrs. Doe's other personalities
and, on certain occasions, assisted her to draw out those
personalities for some of her friends and acquaintances.

(Tr. at

pp. 43, 155-61, 239, 394, Div. Ex 5 ) .
9.

On May 16, 1988, Respondent met with D.P., Mrs.

Doe's marriage and family therapist, and D.G., her clinical
social worker.

The therapist advised Respondent that his

(Respondent's) involvement with Mrs. Doe was not as a clinician
under D.P.'s supervision, control or responsibility.

D.P. also

advised Respondent that he (the therapist) did no condone
Respondent's living with Mr. and Mrs. Doe and that his
(Respondent's) behavior was interfering with the therapeutic
process.

D.P. requested that Respondent act to eliminate that

problem.

Respondent denied any sexual involvement with Mrs. Doe

at that time.
10.

(Tr. at pp. 39-43, 470, Div. Ex. 2 ) .
After May 1988, Respondent and Mr. and Mrs. Doe

relocated and, from June 1988 until mid-July 1988, they lived at
Respondent's residence.

Depending on their work schedules,

either Respondent or Mr. Doe were present with Mrs. Doe on a
continuous basis during the three months which they resided
together.

Respondent had no contract with Mr. and Mrs. Doe to
5

provide home nursing care of the latter.

However, based on the

more credible evidence presented, the care which Respondent
provided to Mrs. Doe from mid-April 1988 until mid-July 1988 was
substantially similar to the care he had provided to her during
her hospitalization.

(Tr. at pp.

157-62, 231-33, 261-62, 270-

77, 385-87, 391-95).
11.

On a number of occasions from mid-April until mid-

July 1988, Respondent and Mrs. Doe had sexual intercourse.

It

cannot be concluded that any such conduct necessarily occurred
while Mrs. Doe was hospitalized.

However, she became pregnant as

a result of intercourse with Respondent which would have occurred
either immediately prior to her discharge from Pioneer Valley
Hospital or within one week thereafter.

During a therapy session

on July 14, 1988, D.P. became aware, through one of Mrs. Doe's
other personalities, that there had been sexual contact between
Mrs. Doe and Respondent. D.P., who had advised Mr. and Mrs. Doe
after they were married in mid-February 1988 that her therapy
would be complicated by a pregnancy, subsequently became aware
that Mrs. Doe was pregnant.

(Tr. at pp. 44, 50-52, 163-66, 222-

30, 400-02, 407-09, 425-32, 559).
12.

Based on the more credible evidence presented, and

due to her multiple personality disorder, Mrs. Doe was not
consciously aware of her prior sexual conduct with Respondent
until shortly before July 14, 1988.

Within 1-2 days after the

July 14, 1988 therapy session, Mrs. Doe advised her husband of
the sexual conduct which had occurred with Respondent and Mr. and
6

Mrs. Doe ceased living with Respondent.

(Tr. at pp. 43-45, 163-

66, 237-38).
13.

On October 3, 1988, a patient, referred to herein

as Sally Smith, was admitted to the Western Institute of
Neuropsychiatry with a diagnosis of multiple personality
disorder.

Her admitting psychiatrist, M.R., had provided

treatment for her since late-summer 1988 and Ms. Smith had been
previously hospitalized at the Western Institute of
Neuropsychiatry under his care.

(Tr. at pp. 320-21, 327, 344-

45).
14.

During Ms. Smith's hospitalization from October 3-

13, 1988, Respondent was not authorized by either M.R. or anyone
else to provide psychiatric nursing care for Ms. Smith, although
Respondent frequently spent time with her and failed to perform
certain assigned responsibilities respecting other patients as a
consequence.

Respondent also visited Ms. Smith at the Institute

during non-working hours.

Ms. Smith discussed her psychiatric

condition with Respondent and he was aware that she had certain
child personalities.

Ms. Smith also informed her psychiatrist,

M.R., as to the amount to time Respondent spent with her and that
he had given her some candy and a teddy bear.

(Tr. at pp. 322-

25, 345-49, 354, 358-65, Div. Ex. 7 ) .
15.

Respondent's nursing supervisor also became aware

of his contacts with Ms. Smith.

On October 10, 1988,

Respondent's supervisor issued a corrective action notice to him,
whereby she instructed Respondent to not deal with Ms. Smith in
7

any manner.

Respondent's employment at the Western Institute of

Neuropsychiatry terminated on October 12, 1988-

Subsequent to

Ms, Smith's discharge from the facility on October 13, 1988, she
socialized with Respondent on a number of occasions.

Respondent

identified Mrs, Doe, by name, and discussed both her condition
and the circumstances of his prior relationship to her with one
of Ms. Smith's personalities.

Respondent periodically spoke to

Ms, Smith's personalities and he also presented gifts to those
personalities.

On two occasions, Ms, Smith spent the night and

slept with Respondent, although it can not be concluded that any
sexual intercourse occurred,

(Tr, at pp. 330-33, 335, 343-57,

Div. Ex. 7 ) ,
16.

Ms. Smith subsequently informed her psychiatrist

of her continued contact with Respondent.

On November 2, 1988,

M,R, spoke with Respondent, expressed concern that Respondent's
continuing contact with Ms. Smith was having a negative impact on
her progress in therapy and advised Respondent to avoid any
future contact with her.

When Respondent's continued contact

with Ms. Smith resulted in subsequent problems between her and
her psychiatrist, Ms. Smith subsequently told Respondent she no
longer wanted to see him and their relationship ended in May
1989.

(Tr, at pp. 326-33, 352-53).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
On appeal Petitioner asserts two arguments; first, that

the decision of the Nursing Board is not supported by substantial
evidence, and second, that the Nurse Practice Act was not
8

intended to include interpersonal relationships between nurses
and former patients.

(Br. at 26)

Each of these arguments is

without merit.
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued by
the Nursing Board and subsequently adopted by the Division in
this case are completely and substantially supported by the
testimony and other evidence contained in the record.
Furthermore, while relationships between health care providers
and former patients may properly form the basis of disciplinary
action under a variety of circumstances, such a determination is
unnecessary here where the Board found that the nurse/patient
relationship that existed between Petitioner and Jane Doe never
clearly ceased during the three months he resided with her after
her discharge from the hospital.

Petitioner's behavior toward

Ms. Smith and Mrs. Doe, both inside the hospital and thereafter,
constituted unprofessional conduct as defined by rule and
statute, and, as the Board and the Division determined, fully
justified revocation of Petitioner's nursing license.
ARGUMENT
I. THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW ENTERED BY THE NURSING BOARD AND ADOPTED
BY THE DIVISION IN THIS CASE ARE SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (1988) of the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act governs judicial review of formal
adjudicated proceedings of administrative agencies in this State.
That section provides in relevant part as follows:

9

The appellate court shall grant relief
only if, on the basis of the agency's record,
it determines that a person seeking judicial
review has been substantially prejudiced by
any of the following:

(g) the agency action is based upon a
determination of fact, made or implied by the
agency, that is not supported by substantial
evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court[.]
Commenting upon this "substantial evidence" test, this
court stated, in Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 7 76 P.2d
63 (Utah App. 1989), as follows:
Substantial evidence is "more than a mere
'scintilla' of evidence . . . though
'something less than the weight of the
evidence*'" (Quoting Idaho State Ins. Fund
v. Hunicutt, 110 Idaho 257, 715 P.2d 927, 930
(1985) and Consolo v. FMC, 383 U.S. 607, 620
(1966)). "Substantial evidence is 'such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'"
Id.

In applying the "substantial evidence test,"
we review the "whole record" before the
court, and this review is distinguishable
"from both a de novo review and the 'any
competent evidence' standard of review."

It is also important to note that the "whole
record test" necessarily requires that a
party challenging the Board's Findings of
Fact must marshall all of the evidence
supporting the findings and show that despite
the supporting facts, and in light of the
conflicting or contradictory evidence, the
findings are not supported by substantial
evidence, (Citations omitted)
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In undertaking such a review, this court will
not substitute its judgment as between two
reasonably conflicting views, even though we
may have come to a different conclusion had
the case come before us for de novo review.
(Citations omitted). It is the province of
the Board, not the appellate courts, to
resolve conflicting evidence, and where
inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the
same evidence, it is for the Board to draw
the inferences, (Citation omitted)
Id. at 68 (Footnotes omitted).
Petitioner argues that the Conclusions of Law reached
by the Nursing Board do not meet the "substantial evidence" test.
(Br. at 32-33) Petitioner characterizes the Conclusions of Law as
constituting 10 "allegations", 4 of which "go beyond the scope of
the Nurse Practice Act and nursing rules."

(Br. at 32) The

remainder of Petitioner's Brief constitutes a dubious attack on
each of the 10 Conclusions of Law, as characterized by
Petitioner, in an attempt to establish that the Conclusions (as
characterized by Petitioner) are not supported by substantial
evidence, and/or that Petitioner's conduct was not subject to
regulation by the Nurse Practice Act and applicable rules.
Interestingly, in attacking the Conclusions of Law reached by the
Nursing Board, Petitioner specifically references only Findings
of Fact Nos. 4, 6, 7, 14 and 15 as failing to meet the
substantial evidence test.

(Br. at 33-38) However, these 5

Findings of Fact, as well as the other 11 reached by the Board,
are supported by substantial evidence, as are the Board's
Conclusions of Law.

11

While the 10 categories into which Petitioner seeks to
pigeonhole the Board's Conclusions of Law do not accurately and
Completely state the Board's entire conclusions, and at times
ignore specific and vital portions of such conclusions, for the
sake of this argument only, the Division will accept Petitioner's
characterization of the Conclusions and will demonstrate that
each is amply supported by substantial evidence in the record.
A.

Conclusions of Law 1 through 6, as Characterized
by Petitioner, are Supported by Substantial
Evidence.

1«

Failing to provide adequate care for all patients

by spending excessive time with Mrs. Doe and Ms. Smith.
33-35)

(Br. at

Contrary to Petitioner's argument that this conclusion is

based solely upon a document appearing in Petitioner's Pioneer
Valley employee file (Br. at 3 3 ) , this conclusion is supported by
Petitioner's own testimony (Tr. at 491-494), where Petitioner
admits that at least portions of the Pioneer Valley report are
correct, without specifying which parts.

The Conclusion of Law

is also supported by testimony from D.G., Mrs. Doe's treating
social worker (Tr. at 287), and again by testimony from
Petitioner (Tr. at 460). Additionally, the document contained in
Petitioner's personnel file with Pioneer Valley Hospital,
entitled "Formal and Informal Supervision and Attempts to Counsel
Richard Heinecke", which is part of Division's Exhibit No. 6, was
prepared by Petitioner's supervisors in the ordinary course of
business.

Thus, even if the document constituted the Board's
12

only basis for this conclusion (which it does not), it would
provide adequate evidence to support the Board's finding.
With respect to Petitioner's failure to provide
adequate care for patients during his employment with the Western
Institute of Neuropsychiatry, S.P., Petitioner's employer and
supervisor, testified to her personal involvement in admonishing
and ultimately discharging Petitioner, in part for leaving his
unit with no one to give medications and no one to handle
emergencies, and for other reasons,

(Tr. at pp. 358-366).

In sum, the record, taken as a whole, provides
substantial evidence for the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law relating to Petitioner's failure to provide adequate care for
all patients under his care by spending excessive time with Mrs.
Doe and Ms. Smith.
2.

Improperly providing confidential information

regarding Jane Doe to Third Parties.

(Br. at 35)

This

Conclusion of Law is supported by testimony from Petitioner (Tr.
at pp. 501-502), and by testimony from Sally Smith (Tr. at pp.
351-352) .
3.

Petitioner worked as a psychiatric nurse even

though he was not licensed as such.

(Br. at 35-37)

Petitioner

states he is unable to find any factual findings which support
this conclusion.

(Br. at 35)

To the contrary, this conclusion

is supported by testimony from D.P., Mrs. Doe's therapist (Tr. at
39-42), by testimony from Mrs. Doe (Tr. at 160-161), stating that
Petitioner told her that he was "doing therapy", and by testimony
13

from S.P., Petitioner's employer at the Western Institute of
Neuropsychiatry (Tr. at 359-360).

The recoird is also replete

with references of Petitioner accessing various personality parts
of Jane Doe and Sally Smith both inside the hospitals, and after
discharge.

Such conduct falls within the definition of

psychotherapy contained in Rule R153-31-5(A)(8) of the Utah
Administrative Code, and thus constitutes a violation of Rule
R153-31-5(H)(4)(c), of the Utah Administrative Code as was found
to be the case by the Board in its Conclusions of Law.
Furthermore, Petitioner's own testimony as to the care he gave to
both Mrs. Doe and Ms. Smith clearly falls within the definition
of psychotherapy.

(Tr. at pp. 534-535).

4/5. Petitioner should not have accepted telephone
calls from Mrs. Doe at home.

(Br. at 37)

Petitioner should not

have informed Mrs. Doe of his pending leave of absence from the
psychiatric unit which caused her to immediately request
discharge from the hospital.

(Br. at 37-38)

As to those

Conclusions of Law listed as Nos. 4 and 5 by Petitioner, clearly
each is set forth as an example of Respondent's "behavior which
adversely affected the physical or psycho-social welfare of both
Mrs. Doe and Ms. Smith." (Findings and Fact and Conclusions of
Law at p. 9 ) . As to the former, Petitioner apparently does not
deny the fact that he received telephone calls from Mrs. Doe.
(Br. at 37)

As to the later, substantial evidence is present

that it was Petitioner that informed Mrs. Doe of his pending

14

leave of absence from the psychiatric unit.

(Tr. at pp. 460,

539).
6.

Petitioner spent a considerable amount of time

with Sally Smith while she was hospitalized and provided gifts to
her.

(Br. at 38-39)

This conclusion is amply supported by the

record, as is apparently acknowledged by Petitioner.
39)

(Br. at 38-

Petitioner acknowledges that performing services for Ms.

Smith during his working and off-duty hours, and providing gifts
to her, "may not have been a good judgmental call."

(Br. at 39)

In fact, this is precisely the Board's point, and is also why
Petitioner's actions constituted unprofessional conduct.

This

finding of fact, as with the previous two, was obviously intended
by the Board as an example of Petitioner's, "over involvement
with Ms. Smith."
9).

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at p.

While taken alone, such acts may not have constituted

sufficient grounds for revocation, all of Petitioner's actions
taken in light of the "whole record" constitute ample evidence of
gross and egregious misconduct on Petitioner's part, justifying
revocation of his license.
In summary, all of the Conclusions of Law characterized
and labeled 1 through 6 in Petitioner's Brief are amply supported
by the record taken as a whole.

As to the remaining Conclusions

of Law, which Petitioner asserts constitute conduct outside the
hospital and therefore, "beyond the scope of the Nurse Practice
Act and Nursing Rules"

(Br. at 32), such conclusions are amply

15

supported by record, and properly form the basis of the Board's
determination that Petitioner engaged in unprofessional conduct,
B,

The Remaining Conclusions of Law, as Characterized
by Petitioner, are Supported by Substantial
Evidence.

1.

Petitioner improperly provided out-patient therapy

for Mrs, Doe,

(Br, at 44-45).

The Board's finding that

Respondent provided therapy for Mrs, Doe after her discharge, and
that that therapy was substantially similar to the care he had
provided to her during her hospitalization is amply supported by
the record.
2.

(Tr. at pp, 394-95, 232 and 270-76).
Petitioner became overly involved with Sally Smith

after her discharge from hospitalization and had a negative
impact upon her relationship with her psychiatrist,
46)

(Br. at 45-

Again, this conclusion is amply supported by evidence in the

record,

(Tr. at pp, 326-33, 352-53).
3.

Respondent improperly had sexual relations with

Mrs. Doe without allowing sufficient lapse of time for the nursepatient relationship to terminate,

(Br» at 45-47)

This

conclusion is supported by testimony from various individuals.
For example, Mrs, Doe testified extensively about Petitioner
having sexual relations with her personality parts without her
consent, both in and out of the hospital, and about conceiving
Mr. Heinecke's child.

(Tr, at pp. 222-238).

Dr. T. J. testified

at length about the time of conception of Mrs. Doe's child,
at pp. 415-33).

(Tr.

Finally, Mr. Heinecke acknowledged paternity of
16

Mrs. Doe's child.

(Tr. at 559), and also testified extensively

about his sexual relations with Mrs. Doe.

(Tr. at pp. 508-11).

The record, taken as a whole, provides substantial evidence for
the Board's conclusion that Mrs. Doe's pregnancy as a result of
intercourse with Mr. Heinecke occurred either immediately prior
to her discharge from Pioneer Valley Hospital or within one week
thereafter.

Interestingly, Petitioner acknowledges in his Brief

that, "it may have been poor judgment on the part of Petitioner
to become romantically and sexually involved with Mrs. Doe."
(Br. at 47)

Petitioner also concludes that, "there is no rule or

statute prohibiting poor judgment, and in light of the total
record . . . the sexual relationship which existed between them
cannot be used as a basis for punishment."
statements are in error.

JEcL

Petitioner's

There are both statutes and rules

governing "practices which fail to conform with the accepted
standards of the specific licensed occupational profession and
which could jeopardize the public health, safety or welfare",
"failing to utilize appropriate judgment in administering safe
nursing practice", and "intentionally committing any act that
adversely affects the physical or psycho-social welfare of the
patient."

Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-2(6); Rule R153-31-6(D)(1)(16)

of the Utah Administrative Code.

Petitioner repeatedly, and in

an abhorrent manner, violated each of these rules, and revocation
of his license was the only appropriate sanction.
4.

Petitioner used his knowledge and skills with Jane

Doe and Sally Smith to promote his own interest in personal
17

relationships with them.

(Br. at 47-48)

As Petitioner points

out, "this charge is essentially a recap of the prior three
allegations of improper contact with Jane Doe and Sally Smithf.]"
(Br, at 47)

Petitioner asserts that "Nurses are not machines or

computers that can be programmed as such and unless it could be
shown that Petitioner improperly used his nursing skills against
these individuals then he can not be charged with misconduct."
(Br. at 48)

The facts, and the record taken as a whole, however,

indicate that Petitioner acted in a grossly inappropriate manner
towards two individuals whom he treated and cared for during his
employment as a registered nurse.

Such conduct is subject to the

Nurse Practice Act, and property forms the basis for a finding
that Petitioner committed unprofessional conduct.

With respect

to Ms. Doe, the record establishes that he accessed her various
personality parts and, without her knowledge, approval or
consent, carried on a sexual relationship with her that resulted
in pregnancy and the delivery of a child.

In the case of Ms.

Smith, Petitioner engaged in inappropriate conduct by becoming
overly involved with Ms. Smith despite being warned repeatedly
against such conduct by his superiors.

This over involvement, at

least in part, resulted in Petitioner's termination of employment
with the Western Institute of Neuropsychiatry.

The record, as a

whole, demonstrates that Petitioner ignored counsel of his
supervisors, and the good of patients in his care, and used
information and skills he gained about Mrs. Doe and Ms. Smith
while they were hospitalized to his personal advantage.
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The most

blatant example of the latter being his access of Mrs. Doe's
personality parts to have sex with her without her consent.

In

sum, this conclusion is supported by substantial (indeed
overwhelming) evidence in the record.
II. PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT THAT HIS CONDUCT
WAS NOT REGULATED BY THE NURSE PRACTICE ACT
IS ERRONEOUS.
Petitioner's attempt to excuse his actions by claiming
that the Nurse Practice Act cannot control his activities after
the two patients were discharged is incorrect, first, because the
Board found that the nurse-patient relationship, at least in the
case of Mrs. Doe, had not terminated, and second, because
Petitioner repeatedly used knowledge, skills and relationships he
acquired with respect to Mrs. Doe and Ms. Smith inappropriately
and to "promote his own interest in- personal relationships with
them."

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at p. 10). Such

conduct related to his practice of nursing, and thus formed a
proper basis for sanctions.
Petitioner argues that, "under the Nursing Practice Act
a person ceases to become [sic] a patient as soon as compensation
for nursing care has ceased."

(Br. at 43)

The implication drawn

by Petitioner is that once a patient is discharged, nothing a
nurse who treated that patient during hospitalization may do with
respect to the patient can subject him to accountability for
unprofessional conduct.

Petitioner's argument is completely

untenable, and contrary to the plain language of the statutes and
rules involved.
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Utah Code Ann. § 58-31-14 provides in relevant part:
The Division has the power to revoke or
suspend any license to practice nursing . . .
if the person:
(b) is guilty of immoral, unethical, or
unprofessional conduct as it relates to the
practice of nursing. (Emphasis added).
Petitioner's immoral, unethical and unprofessional
actions toward Ms. Smith and Mrs. Doe after each was released
from hospitalization (in addition to those committed during
hospitalization and toward other individuals) clearly related to
Petitioner's practice of nursing, and thus constituted actions
subject to the standards of the Nurse Practice Act.

Petitioner

ignores the fact that he used knowledge, skills and relationships
developed during his care for these two psychiatric patients
during their hospitalization to further his own sordid interests
in them after their release.

Petitioner's conduct was,

therefore, no different than that of a nurse who might steal
drugs while on duty and, after using the drugs at home, claim
that such conduct cannot be subject to the Nurse Practice Act.
The fallacy of such an argument is apparent.
Finally, Petitioner conveniently ignores, during his
discussion of applicability of the Nurse Practice Act (Br. at 4043), any reference to the Board's conclusions regarding the
negative impact that his conduct toward Mrs. Doe and Ms. Smith
after their hospitalization had upon their therapy, and the
Board's findings that, at least as to Mrs. Doe, the nurse/patient
relationship never clearly ceased while Petitioner lived with
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Mrs. Doe after her discharge.

These conclusions are completely

and substantially supported by the record, and lend further
illumination to the transparently flawed argument offered by
Petitioner, that his conduct toward these patients after
hospitalization is somehow shielded from scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
Under the "substantial evidence" test, the record in
this case, taken as a whole, amply supports each of the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law reached by the Board and
subsequently adopted by the Division, and not only supports, but
mandates, the action taken by the Board, namely, revocation of
Petitioner's license to practice as a registered nurse.
DATED this off ^ day of August, 1990.
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